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EDUCATION
[Ulniversal education should go along with and accompany the uni-
versal ballot in America; that the very best, firmest, and most enduring
basis of our republic was the education, the thorough and the univer-
sal education of the great American people; and that the intelligence
of the mass of our people was the light and life of the republic.'
A crucial contemporary controversy revolves around appropriate
education for children. Specifically, parents, educators, and politicians
fear that problems stemming from factors such as financial stress within
the school districts and gang violence in schools riddle the current public
school system.2 Parents have begun to challenge the extent of their rights
to direct the upbringing of their children in the educational context.'
Home schooling, once the province of religious fundamentalists and
ideologues "who rejected the institutional nature of public schools," has
become increasingly mainstream. In many states, voters and politicians
hotly contest plans to organize school vouchers and private school tax
credits.' Congress increasingly is scrutinizing long-standing federal aid
plans to support specific populations in public schools.7
This survey will examine the current educational debate as exempli-
fied in three cases that came before the United States Court of Appeals
0
1. A statement by Abraham Lincoln recollected by William Henry Hemdon. DON E.
FEHRENBACHER & VIRGINIA FEHRENBACHER, RECOuLzECmD WORDS OF ABRAHAM LINcOLN 244
(1996).
2. Wendy Wheeler, Comment & Note, Is Home Schooling Constitutional?, 1995 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 78, 78 (discussing the myriad reasons parents are choosing to home school their chil-
dren including increasing violence, poor academic standards, drug use in public schools and relig-
ious beliefs).
3. See infra notes 137-68 and accompanying text.
4. Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, Learning at Home: Does It Pass the Test?,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1998, at 64, 66 (discussing the increasingly popular alternative of home
schooling in America).
5. See, e.g., Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 EDUC. L. REP.
1, 1-2 (1997) (discussing the likely outcome of state litigation over the constitutionality of vouchers
that could encompass sectarian schools).
6. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, Amendment 17: Income Tax
Credit for Education, in PUB. NO. 438, ANALYSIS OF 1998 BALLOT PROPOSALS 35, 36 (1998) (pro-
posing a constitutional amendment to institute an income tax credit for Colorado parents who either
home school their children or send them to private or public schools), available at
<http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstafflballotanaly-17.htm>; Jim Fisher, Kempthorne
Pressured to Drain School Budget, LEWISTON MORNING TRiB., Feb. 9, 1999, at 10A (discussing
pressures the Idaho governor faces as a supporter of private school tax credits); Ledyard King,
Private-School Tax Credit Killed, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 5, 1999, at B4 (describing the defeat of a
private school tax credit bill amid heated debate); Private-School Tax Credits Face Debate,
DESERET NEWS, Jan. 18, 1999, at B02.
7. See, e.g., Carol Jouzaitis, Senate Panel OKs Keeping School Lunches, Food Stamps-But
With Cuts, CRL TRIB., June 15, 1995, at 18 (approving the maintenance of the federal lunch program
in the Senate's welfare restructuring bill even though many conservative Republicans wanted to turn
this program over to state regulation).
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for the Tenth Circuit in 1997-98.& Part I examines the effect of the 1997
Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),9
in relation to public education services for disabled children whose par-
ents voluntarily placed them at private schools. Upon a Supreme Court
remand, the Tenth Circuit reexamined the application of the IDEA to
disabled children in private schools in Fowler v. Unified School District
No. 259, Sedgwick County, Kansas." In O'Toole v. Olathe District
Schools Unified School District No. 233," the Tenth Circuit held the
Amendments, while making significant changes to the IDEA, did not
change the interpretive standard that has controlled the application of the
IDEA for the last fifteen years. 2 Part II discusses the rights of parents to
direct the educational upbringing of their children. In Swanson v. Guthrie
Independent School District No. l-L, 3 the Tenth Circuit denied home
schooled students a constitutional right to attend public schools on a part-
time basis and further found a lack of any fundamental parental right to
control all aspects of a child's education.'
I. THE INDIVIDUALS wiTH DIsABILmES EDUCATION ACT 5
A. Background
The genesis of the current enactment of the IDEA came in 1966,
when Congress amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
to establish a grant program "for the purpose of assisting the States in the
initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects.., for
the education of handicapped children."'" A few years later, Congress
began to address the limited opportunities for appropriate public educa-
8. This survey address decisions rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1997, and August 31, 1998.
9. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp.
1I 1997)).
10. 128 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Fowler I]. In this case, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld its previous determination that a school district must pay the same amount
for special education services provided to a student voluntarily enrolled at a private school as it pays
for such services for a public school student. See infra notes 55-76 and accompanying text. The
court reconsidered the issue in Fowler II because the Supreme Court had vacated and remanded its
first decision in light of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA. See Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No.
259, Sedgwick County, Kan., 107 F.3d 797, 807-08 (10th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Fowler 1], vacated
and remanded by Unified Sch.. Dist. No. 259, Sedgwick County, Kan. v. Fowler, 521 U.S. 1115
(1997). For a discussion of Fowler 1, see Bryan M. Schwartz, Tenth Circuit Survey, Education:
Balancing the Interests of Schools, Students, and the Community, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 801, 802-09
(1998) (focusing on statutory aspects of the IDEA).
11. 144 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 1998).
12. See O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 701.
13. 135 F.3d 694(10th Cir. 1998).
14. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 702.
15. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp.
1111997)).
16. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, sec. 161,
§ 601(a), 80 Stat. 1191, 1204.
EDUCATION
tion for disabled children, appropriating funds to states upon the condi-
tion that they develop programs to meet the needs of handicapped stu-
dents.'7 It was not until 1974, however, that Congress put any bite into
the law, making each state grant for special education funding contingent
upon the state adopting "a goal of providing full educational opportuni-
ties to all handicapped children,... a detailed timetable for accomplish-
ing such a goal, and ... a description of the kind and number of facili-
ties, personnel, and services necessary throughout the State to meet such
a goal.'
'5
Despite these stringent requirements, when Congress enacted the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,' many in Con-
gress believed a majority of handicapped children in the United States
"were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idly in regular class-
rooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to 'drop out.'
''
Consequently, Congress drafted legislation granting states federal fund-
ing only if each state demonstrated that it had "in effect a policy that
assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public
education."'"
The IDEA's "free appropriate public education" requirement tailors
itself to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an "indi-
vidualized educational program" (IEP).' The IEP is a written statement
prepared at a meeting between "a representative of the local educational
agency," the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardians, and, when-
ever appropriate, the child. An IEP includes educational objectives and
services to be provided.23 The IDEA provides procedural requirements
for any change of an IEP ' and avenues for parent complaints regarding
the provision of special education and related services.' While the law
requires parental involvement in the development of an educational pro-
17. See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 613(a) 84 Stat. 175, 179
(1970).
18. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, sec. 61 5(c)(1), § 613(b)(1)(C), 88
Stat. 484, 583.
19. Pub. L. No.94-142,89 Stat. 773(1975).
20. H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975).
21. Education for All Handicapped Children Act § 612(1), 89 Stat. at 780. Over the next two
decades, the name and statutory language of the Act was changed to reflect new nomenclature,
identifying persons covered under the Act as "disabled" rather than "handicapped." Cf., e.g., Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-119, sec. 25(a)(5), §
612(3), 105 Stat. 587, 606. The general thrust of the statutory provision remained the same, how-
ever, even with subsequent linguistic changes. Cf Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 101, 111 Stat. 37, 60 (1997)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (Supp. InI 1997)).
22. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (Supp. 111 1997) (defining the term "free appropriate public
education"); id. § 1414(d) (giving the parameters for establishing and revising an IEP).
23. Id. § 1414 (d)(1)(B).
24. See id. § 1415(b).
25. See id. § 1415(e), (f).
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gram for disabled students, parents have limited authority to dictate daily
educational decisions for their children.'
1. Application of the IDEA Before the Amendments
Board of Education v. Rowley" drove the interpretation of the IDEA
before the 1997 Amendments.' In Rowley, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the lower courts' interpretation of a
free appropriate public education." The Court determined that a child is
receiving a free appropriate public education as defined by the IDEA "if
personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive
services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction.""w
The Court recognized that Congress, in its passage of the IDEA,
sought to provide access to education for handicapped children, but "did
not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard
than would be necessary to make such access meaningful."' The Court
determined that "the intent of the Act was more to open the door of pub-
lic education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guar-
antee any particular level of education once inside.' Thus, state-
provided specialized services did not have "to maximize each child's
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided other children." '33
The IDEA only secured access to special instruction and related services
as a "basic floor of opportunity" to disabled children. 4 Ultimately, for a
state program to be in compliance with the Act, educational agencies
need to provide disabled children a mere opportunity for educational
benefit.33 Critics of the decision claim the Court's focus on the educa-
tional benefit standard and other factors sets low expectations for educa-
tional advancement and allows educational agencies to minimally com-
ply with the provisions and policy goals of the IDEA.'
26. See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
27. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
28. See Tara L. Eyer, Commentary, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments
Raise the Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 126 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 8 (1998).
29. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186.
30. Id. at 189.
31. Id. at 192.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 198.
34. Id. at201.
35. See id at 206-07.
36. See Eyer, supra note 28, at 1, 8 (1998) (including factors such as routinely granting pass-
ing marks and advancing children to the next grade level).
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2. The 1997 Amendments
In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA7 (Amendments) because
Congress believed "that the critical issue now is to place greater empha-
sis on improving student performance and ensuring that children with
disabilities receive a quality public education."" Congress set forth sev-
eral broad goals in conjunction with this legislation. Members of Con-
gress who drafted the Amendments emphasized "what is best education-
ally for children with disabilities" while still giving teachers and other
educational professionals more flexibility in providing education for dis-
abled students. 9 Additionally, Congress wanted to be certain parents had
an enhanced role in deciding the best educational course for their dis-
abled children.' While the law had been very successful over the course
of its twenty-two year existence, the Amendments aimed to remedy the
fact that "[t]oo many students with disabilities are failing courses and
dropping out of school."'
Thus, the Amendments support a continuum of educational place-
ments for disabled children that includes placement in "regular classes,
special classes, special schools," and home instruction.4" This legislative
support of varying educational placements for disabled children may
create tension between parents and educators. Even as the Act supports
parental involvement and a wide range of educational options for chil-
dren, the local educational agency has a tremendous amount of discretion
in both placing children and determining which special educational
services will be provided." Despite congressional language that suggests
a desire for parental involvement in the choice of appropriate education
for their children, too much parental control may conflict with specific
needs of local educational agencies. Local agencies must have flexibility
in the educational options they offer to children with disabilities so the
agencies can keep the costs of special educational services as low as pos-
sible."
One significant aspect of the Amendments is a congressional re-
sponse to increased litigation initiated by parents demanding IDEA funds
37. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
111 Stat. 37, 37-105 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419 (Supp. 111 1997)).
38. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 3 (1997).
39. Id. at 2.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 5. The Senate report notes that the number of disabled students involved in post-
secondary education tripled, while the unemployment rate for such individuals benefiting from the
act over the past 22 years is "almost half that of their older counterparts." Id.
42. - d. at 11.
43. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (suggesting that local educational agencies
have a great deal of discretion in placement and implementation of appropriate services).
44. SeeS. REP. No. 105-17, at 2.
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for their disabled children voluntarily placed in private schools.' The
Amendments, for the first time, specifically deal with unilateral parental
placement of disabled children in a private school.' The legislation states
the total amount of money spent to provide special education and related
services to children in the state placed voluntarily by their parents in pri-
vate schools is limited to a proportional amount of the federal funds
available. 7 This is an "amount consistent with the number and location of
private school children with disabilities in the State."'
The Amendments also permit school districts to provide IDEA
funded special education and related services on the premises of private
and parochial schools. ' Educational agencies must reimburse parents for
the costs of special education services for privately placed disabled chil-
dren only under certain conditions.' If, for example, an educational
agency failed to offer a disabled child a free appropriate public education
in a timely manner, an administrative law judge or court could order total
reimbursement for the child's private or parochial education." Even with
an adequate IEP in place and a public school providing a free appropriate
public education to the child, one interpretation of the new Amendments
suggests that parents may not be deprived of all federal assistance for
their disabled child even if they unilaterally place their child in a private
school.2
At the time the Amendments were signed into law, the Department
of Education (DOE) determined that it would take comments from the
public to aid it in developing regulations to govern the education of dis-
abled children under the amended IDEA. 3 As of January 20, 1998, the
DOE had received over 4,500 written comments." The DOE has yet to
45. See id at 13. For a more detailed discussion of the broad effects of the Amendments, see
Dixie Snow Huefner, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 122
EDUC. L. REP. 1103, 1103 (1998) (discussing the myriad changes that "affect eligibility, evaluation,
programming (IEPs), public and private placements, discipline, funding, attorneys' fees, dispute
resolution, and procedural safeguards for students served under IDEA-Part B").
46. See S. REP. No. 105-17, at 13 (noting that "[tihe bill makes a number of changes to clarify
the responsibility of public school districts to children with disabilities who are placed by their
parents in private schools").
47. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. 111 1997) ("Amounts expended for the provi-
sion of those services by a local educational agency shall be equal to a proportionate amount of
Federal funds made available under this subchapter.").
48. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 13.
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(II) ("Such services may be provided to children with
disabilities on the premises of private, including parochial, schools, to the extent consistent with
law.").
50. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C).
51. See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
52. See discussion of Fowler II, infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
53. See Notice of Request for Advice and Recommendations, 62 Fed. Reg. 35,052 (1997).
54. See Department of Education, Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 63
Fed. Reg. 61,235, 61,236 (1998).
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post the amended regulations that should assist in the interpretation and
application of the Amendments?'
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259, Sedgwick County,
Kansas (Fowler I)'
a. Facts
Michael Fowler, a deaf twelve-year-old boy, qualified as a disabled
child under the IDEA." After spending four years at a public school
where the school district clustered students with hearing problems, Mi-
chael's parents voluntarily transferred him to a private school because
they felt the private school could better serve Michael's needs.58 The par-
ents asked the school district to provide Michael with interpretive serv-
ices at his private school. 9 The school district refused the request, and
administrative proceedings upheld the district's denial of services.' On
appeal, the district court ordered the school district to pay the entire cost
of on-site interpretive services for Michael." On appeal from that deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit found the school district was responsible for pay-
ing for such special services only an amount up to "the average cost to
the District to provide the same service to hearing-impaired students in
the public school setting."' In light of the 1997 Amendments to the
IDEA, the Supreme Court vacated that decision and remanded the case to
the Tenth Circuit to consider the effects of the Amendments.63
b. Decision
On remand, the Tenth Circuit held that their prior interpretation of
the pre-Amendment IDEA applied to the parties in this case." Initially,
the court analyzed whether the IDEA Amendments should apply retro-
actively. The court reasoned that absent a clear congressional indication
that the Amendments merely clarified the proper implementation of the
IDEA, the Amendments would apply "only to events occurring after the
55. See Fowler I1, 128 F.3d 1431, 1438 n.5 (10th Cir. 1997) (utilizing the proposed regula-
tions in interpreting the IDEA).
56. 128 F.3d 1431. Fora procedural history of the Fowler cases, see supra note 10





62. Fowler 1, 107 F.3d 797, 807-08 (1Oth Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded by 521 U.S. 1115
(1997).
63. See Fowler II, 128 F.3d at 1433.
64. See id. at 1436. The Tenth Circuit did not substantively change its interpretation of the
IDEA as it relates to federal funding for private school children but accentuated the need to calculate
a proportionate share. See id. at 1437.
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Act's effective date."3 Consequently, the old IDEA applied to the pay-
ment of Michael's interpretive services provided at the private school he
attended up to the effective date of the Amendments.' The school dis-
trict, therefore, was obligated to pay "an amount up to, but not more
than, the average cost to the District" for providing the same service to a
hearing-impaired child at a public school.67
The school district's obligation to Michael's parents changed
slightly, however, with the implementation of the Amendments. The
court held that the Amendments provided that parents who placed their
children voluntarily in private schools when a local agency has offered a
free appropriate public education are not entitled to reimbursement "for
the cost of the child's education, including any special education and
related services." Rather, in cases such a Michael's, "the local agency's
sole obligation is to spend... a 'proportionate amount of Federal funds,'
which amount is apparently to be derived from considering the 'number
and location' of such students compared to the total population of stu-
dents requiring special education and related services. '  The Tenth Cir-
cuit remanded the case to the district court to determine the calculation of
Michael's proportionate share of the funds the federal government gave
to Michael's local school district under the IDEA."
c. Analysis
Before Fowler 11, some critics feared the 1997 Amendments to the
IDEA would grant too much discretion to school districts because the
districts would have unilateral authority to decide whether or not they
would pay for a private school child's special education." The proposed
regulations for the governance of the IDEA suggest that the local agency
will have the authority to decide which private school children will re-
ceive services, which services will be provided, and in what manner. ' In
a footnote, the court suggested that implementing these proposed regula-
65. Id. at 1436.
66. See id,
67. See id.; cf. Julie F. Mead, Expressions of Congressional Intent: Examining the 1997
Amendments to the IDEA, 127 EDUC. L. REP. 511, 527 (1998) (discussing the requirements under
the statute for "equitable participation" that requires private school students to have the same op-
portunities available to them for IDEA benefits).
68. Fowler I1, 128 F.3d at 1436.
69. Id. at 1437 (quoting Individuals with Disabilities Act Amendments of 1997, 20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. 1I 1997)).
70. See id. at 1439.
71. See, e.g., William L. Dowling, Special Education and the Private School Student: The
Mistake of the IDEA Amendments Act, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 79, 83 (1997) (arguing that the 1997
Amendments limit a court's ability to require a school board to pay for the education of a disabled
child at a private school).
72. Cf. Proposed Rules Department of Education, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,026, 55,094 (1997) (to be
codified at 34 CF.R. pt. 300) (proposed Oct. 22, 1997).
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tions could lead to "the proportionate share of Federal funds [being] zero
for any particular private school disabled student."
Given the current absence of finalized interpretive regulations for
the Amendments, ' parents have little guidance in knowing whether a
private school placement may effectively remove their children from
federal funding as the local educational agency evaluation is determina-
tive. This illustrates the inherent conflict between what parents subjec-
tively believe is educationally best for their child, and the local school
district's goals of flexibility and cost cutting in providing education.'
Significantly, the Fowler I decision suggests that parents who place
their disabled children in private schools do not risk cutting their children
off from all federal funds for special education because such children
should still be entitled to a proportionate share of the federal money
available under the IDEA.
These unilateral parental placement decisions may, however,
threaten prompt disbursement of funding to disabled children as the state,
likely the school district itself, must determine the proportionate share of
federal funding to which the child is entitled. This calculation may be
complicated enough to delay getting the necessary funding to the needy
child and may give rise to a new and uncharted arena for litigation.
2. O'Toole v. Olathe District Schools Unified District No. 2337
a. Facts
Molly O'Toole was diagnosed with moderate to profound hearing
loss.'5 She began her education at her local school district's hearing im-
paired program where school district employees and her parents devel-
oped an IEP for her in February 1993." In June 1993, Molly's father had
the Central Institute for the Deaf (CID), a private residential student pro-
gram, evaluate Molly's special education needs. ' In light of CID's
evaluation, her parents requested another IEP meeting in August 1993,
where the school district agreed to change Molly's IEP in accordance
with CID's recommendations but decided to keep her enrolled in the
73. Fowler ll, 128 F.3d at 1438 n.5.
74. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
75. See supra text accompanying note 44.
76. See Fowler 11, 128 F.3d at 1436-37 & n.4.
The proposed regulations define 'proportionate amount' as 'an amount that is the same
proportion of the [local educational agency's] total subgrant [under Part B] ... as the
number of private school children with disabilities... residing in its jurisdiction is to the
total number of children with disabilities in its jurisdiction.'
Id. at 1437 n.4 (quoting Proposed Rules Department of Education, supra note 72, at 55094).
77. 144 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 1998).
78. See O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 695.
79. See id at 696. For a discussion of the nature of an TEP, see supra text accompanying notes
22-26.
80. See O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 696.
1999]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
district's program.' Molly's parents questioned the adequacy of the IEP
and the school district's ability to meet Molly's needs; consequently,
they enrolled Molly at CID. 2 When Mr. O'Toole requested that the
school district reimburse him for Molly's educational expenses at CID;
the district refused. 3 After exhausting their administrative appeals and
losing at the district court level, Molly's parents appealed to the Tenth
Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of Molly's IEP and arguing that Kan-
sas law requires a higher standard of education than under federal law.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit upheld the administrative law adjudication."
First, the court rejected the O'Toole's argument that a Kansas adminis-
trative regulation about placement of a disabled child evidences any in-
tent to require school districts to provide a particular level of educational
services." Second, the court evaluated the adequacy of Molly's IEP to
determine whether the IEP was "'reasonably calculated to enable [her] to
receive educational benefits. ' 
87
The court decided it could only evaluate the adequacy of the IEP as
of the time the' school district and Molly's parents designed it because
"'[n]either the statute nor reason countenance "Monday Morning Quar-
terbacking" in evaluating the appropriateness of a child's placement."'''
The fact that Molly's parents pulled her from the school before the
school district could implement the amended IEP mandated that the court
examine that IEP prospectively.' Given this, the court determined
Molly's IEPs, even if not optimal, were designed to, and did, confer edu-
cational benefits in accordance with the IDEA.'
The court stressed that although Molly was happier and made more
progress at CID, that did not necessarily make CID the appropriate edu-
cational setting for her." The court adopted a recent Second Circuit
analysis stating a "'disabled child is 'not entitled to placement in a resi-
dential school merely because the latter would more nearly enable the
child to reach his or her full potential." ' Ultimately, because "Molly's
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 696-97.
84. See id. at 697-98.
85. See id at 709.
86. See id. at 700-01.
87. Id. (quoting Urban v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 726 (10th Cir. 1996)
(requiring the court to ask "whether the State complied with IDEA procedures, including whether
the TEP conformed with the requirements of the Act")).
88. Id. (quoting Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 534 (3d Cir. 1995)).
89. See id. at 707-08.
90. See id. at 708.
91. See id
92. Id. (quoting Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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IEPs were reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit on her and
she made sufficient progress toward" the goals set forth in the IEPs, they
met the requirements of both Kansas's law and the IDEA.93
c. Analysis
The court seems to support the independent discretion of the district
in both its refusal to pay for the private education of Molly O'Toole and
its determination of the adequacy of her IEPs." In fact, the court system
may not be the best place to determine the adequacy of a student's IEP
because courts are so removed from educational processes and goals.
First, a court evaluation of a school's plan for a student unjustly shifts the
focus from the needs of the student to the judicial proceedings."' Second,
this exercise of judicial discretion undermines the ideal cooperative rela-
tionship between the parent and school system and can make that rela-
tionship unduly adversarial."
The court did not examine the specific history and language of the
Amendments and conformed to the "'basic floor of opportunity' stan-
dard set forth in Rowley.' The fact that Congress specifically amended
the IDEA to include an explicit indication of "how the child's disability
affects the child's involvement and progress in the general curriculum""
as well as "a statement of measurable annual goals" has led critics to
suggest the Rowley "access" standard is no longer the correct measuring
stick for IDEA compliance." Rather, Congress designed the Amend-
ments to improve the effectiveness of special education and increase the
benefits afforded to children with disabilities "to the extent such benefits
are necessary to achieve measurable progress."'0 ' Measurable progress
suggests meaningful progress and not mere access to education as set
forth in Rowley."'
The court rejected any new standard for determining what level of
education the IDEA Amendments require educational agencies to offer
to disabled students." Indeed, the court made clear that the statutes and
93. Id
94. See id at 701-08.
95. Cf LaDonna L. Boeckman, Note, Bestowing the Key to Public Education: The Effects of
Judicial Determinations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act on Disabled and Nondis-
abled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 855, 879 (1998).
96. Cf. id.
97. O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 698 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,201 (1982)).
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. 11 1997).
99. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii).
100. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 28, at 17 (suggesting that the courts should continue to define
the "educational benefit" standard so that it complies with the Amendments that suggest meaningful
educational progress).
101. Id. at 16.
102. See id. at 17.
103. See O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 701 (10th Cir.
1998).
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regulations only mandate that a school "'provide an appropriate educa-
tion, not the best possible education, or the placement the parents pre-
fer."''' Nor does the IDEA "require the best possible education or supe-
rior results.""
The O'Tooles' unilateral decision to enroll Molly at CID, despite
the school district's willingness to implement CID's suggestions into
Molly's IEP, eliminated the possibility of full reimbursement for Molly's
CID tuition.'" Arguably, however, the court could have ordered the
school district to determine and distribute the proportionate share of the
federal funds due to Molly under the IDEA. According to Fowler 11, this
proportionate share would have been available to her for special educa-
tion and related services regardless of where she went to school."
C. Other Circuits
Despite the controversy surrounding the application of the Rowley
standard of "educational benefit" to disabled children,'" no circuit court
has determined that the Rowley standard should be modified based on the
recent Amendments. Rather, like the Tenth Circuit in O'Toole, other
circuits have found that the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA do not re-
quire the local educational agency to pay for services if the disabled
child's parents voluntarily enroll her at a private school unless the local
agency did not provide an adequate educational plan for the child."
In Foley v. Special School District of St. Louis County,"' the Eighth
Circuit examined the language of the Amendments and their relationship
to existing state law."' The Foleys argued that the IDEA provision per-
mitting special educational services on-site at private schools preempted
104. O'Toole, 144 F.3d at 708 (quoting Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1057 (7th Cir.
1997)).
105. Id. (quoting Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 1997)).
106. See id. at 697.
107. See Fowler II, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436-37 (10th Cir. 1997).
108. See Eyer, supra note 28, at 2.
109. See, e.g., Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 134 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that since the school district's IEP "complied with requirements of IDEA, it cannot be
ordered to reimburse the parents" for their voluntary enrollment of their child in private school);
Tucker v. Calloway County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that parents
"are not entitled to dictate educational methodology or to compel a school district to supply a spe-
cific program for their disabled child"); Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F., 118 F.3d
245, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide the student
with a meaningful educational benefit and his placement in public system was appropriate); Donald
B. v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 117 F.3d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the school
district was not required to transport student three blocks from private school to public school for
speech therapy as this did not deprive him "of a genuine opportunity for equitable participation in a
special education program").
110. 153 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 1998)




a state statute prohibiting public school educators on the premises of
private schools.' 2 The court held that the IDEA gives students and par-
ents no individual rights to services provided at a specific location."3
Furthermore, state law may effectively deny any provision of special
educational services on-site at private schools."'
Only one other circuit has formally adopted the "proportionate
share" rationale set forth in Fowler 11. In Russman v. Board of Education
of the Enlarged City School District (Russman 1),' the Second Circuit
decided that states need provide only those services to children voluntar-
ily enrolled in private schools that can be purchased with a proportionate
share of the allocated federal funds."6 In that case, the parents of a men-
tally retarded student deserving of special education services contended
that the school district must provide those services on the premises of the
private Catholic school where her parents voluntarily enrolled her."7
Like Fowler I, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Second
Circuit's first disposition of the case in light of the 1997 Amendments to
the IDEA."' In the first proceeding, the court upheld the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the Russmans and determined that the
school district must provide an on-site teacher and teacher's aide to Col-
leen at her private school."9
On remand, however, the Second Circuit held in favor of the school
district.'" The court reiterated the Fowler court's position that a local
agency's only obligation is "to expend a proportionate share of the fed-
eral" funding received under the IDEA for children voluntarily enrolled
in private schools when the local agency was willing and able to provide
a free appropriate public education.'"' The Second Circuit further clarified
a local educational agency's obligations to disabled children at private
schools. The court found the statute, in light of the legislative history,
could not be interpreted to require local school districts to provide spe-
cial education services on-site at private schools.'" Rather, the local edu-
cational agency may, at its sole discretion, determine where it shall pro-
vide services and clearly is under no statutory obligation to provide such
special services on site."
112. See id. at 865 (overruling the inferred preemption).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. 150 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Russman I1].
116. See Russman 1I, 150 F.3d at 221.
117. See id. at 220.
118. See Board of Educ. of the Enlarged City Sch. Dist. v. Russman, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
119. See Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Russman i].
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II. THE RIGHT OF HOME SCHOOLED STUDENTS TO BENEFIT FROM
PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION
A. Background
Providing public school facilities and services for its residents is one
of the most significant functions of a state."4 However important this
interest is, it must be balanced against parents' right to make the most
basic decisions about the upbringing of their children, including the right
to guide and direct their education.'" In the early days of our government,
Congress deemed that "[rieligion, morality, and knowledge, being neces-
sary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged."'26 In Meyer v. Ne-
braska,'27 the Supreme Court recognized the right of parents to make the
most fundamental decisions about their children.'25 The Court held that a
state statute prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English
infringed upon the rights of parents.' The Court stated "[e]vidently the
Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of mod-
em language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowl-
edge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their
own.''1° Soon after, in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names
of Jesus and Mary,"' the Court struck down a state statute requiring pub-
lic school attendance as it "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.
'' 32
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically dealt with the is-
sue of home schooling, the Court determined that the parental right to
direct a child's education does fall within the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.3 3 If a constitutionally protected right
exists, then the government may not interfere with private educational
decisions concerning one's child without a compelling reason.' An ex-
124. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (discussing the state's responsibility for
the education of its citizens and its power to "impose reasonable regulations" thereon ).
125. Cf. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (stating that "a [sitate's interest in universal education.., is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests").
126. Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-West of the River Ohio, I Stat.
50,52 (1789).
127. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
128. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-401.
129. See id. at 401.
130. Id.
131. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
132. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
133. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (illustrating that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a broader range of liberty rights than those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution).
134. See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1041-43 (1988) (recognizing the state has a
compelling interest in the education of a child, the court found no persuasive arguments to indicate
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amination of the relevant case law, however, leads to the conclusion that
"there is no broad, if any, fundamental nonreligious right to home in-
struction.""' Additionally, the state interest in the upbringing and educa-
tion of its future citizens suffices to allow the government some level of
control in educational policies and practice within the state, thereby
abridging parental direction.'"
B. Tenth Circuit Case-Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School Dis-
trict No. I -L' 
3 7
1. Facts
Her parents home schooled Annie Swanson since she began school
because they wished to instruct her on Christian principles that the public
school curriculum excludes.'38 Through a special agreement between the
school superintendent and Annie's parents, Annie attended certain
classes at the public school on a part-time basis for her whole seventh
grade year.'39 The next year, the school board and a new superintendent
developed a policy mandating full-time enrollment for all students in the
public schools.'"' The board felt that because part-time students did not
count for state financial aid purposes, allowing Annie to attend on a part-
time basis would set a precedent for other part-time students to take ad-
vantage of public school facilities on an "as wanted" basis without any
increase in state funding."' After the district court granted summary
judgment for the school district, the plaintiffs appealed.'
4 2
the parents had a fundamental right to unlimited supervision of their child's education); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15, 234 (1972) (holding the religious beliefs of the Amish
were First and Fourteenth Amendment interests that prevented the state from compelling Amish
children from attending formal high school).
135. Perry A. Zirkel, The Case Law Concerning Home Instruction, 29 EDuc. L. REP. 9, 11
(1986) (recognizing the "power of the state to compel attendance at some school," and noting the
void in Supreme Court cases addressing home instruction). But see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 (sug-
gesting "that courts must move with great circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate
task of weighing a State's legitimate social concem when faced with religious claims for exemption
from generally applicable education requirements").
136. Cf Murphy, 852 F.2d at 1042, 1043.
137. 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
138. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 696.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 696-97.
141. id.; cf Eugene C. Bjorklun, Home Schooled Students: Access to Public School Extracur-
ricular Activities, 109 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 5 (1996) (stating the school district argument that "a public
school's primary responsibility is to serve its own students and allowing home schooled students to
participate could take some opportunities away from the regularly enrolled students"); David W.
Fuller, Comment & Note, Public School Access: The Constitutional Right of Home-Schoolers to
"Opt In" to Public Education on a Part-Time Basis, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1626 (1998) (stating
that "the principal justification school districts offer when denying home-schoolers permission to opt
into classes or extracurricular activities is that of administrative inconvenience").
142. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 696.
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that the school board's policy pertaining to
part-time students was "a neutral rule of general applicability."'"3 The
policy allowed the "[diefendants to prove a reasonable relationship be-
tween the part-time attendance policy and a legitimate purpose of the
school board" which warranted an affirmation of the grant of summary
judgment.'"
The Swansons' argued that the part-time attendance policy dis-
criminated specifically against Christian home schoolers'" The court
rejected that argument as the policy did not prohibit the Swansons' "from
home-schooling Annie in accordance with their religious beliefs.'"' In
fact, the school board's full-time attendance policy applied to all home
schooled students regardless of their families' basis for this educational
choice' 7 Significantly, only a full-time student could take advantage of
the school district's educational opportunities."
The court determined "that parents simply do not have a constitu-
tional right to control each and every aspect of their children's education
and oust the state's authority over that subject."'4 9 Additionally, the court
found that no parental right allows parents to dictate that their children
can attend public school for only part of the day despite a contrary but
neutral school board policy.' The Swansons' claims were "mere invoca-
tion[s]" of a general right and did not suffice to make a "colorable
showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitutional
rights."'s'
143. Id. at 703.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 698.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 699-700.
149. Id. at 699. The court relied on cases that have limited the rights of parents to direct their
children's education in that they cannot exempt a child from reading programs they did not approve
of, a school's community service program, or from sexually explicit assemblies. See id.; see also
Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 457 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenging a mandatory school
community service program); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 529 (1st Cir.
1995) (objecting to an allegedly indecent compulsory AIDS and sex education program in a public
high school); Fleishchfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1994)
(claiming that a grade school supplemental reading program indoctrinated children in values op-
posed to plaintiffs' Christian beliefs, thus violating the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir.
1987) (controverting the forced reading of school books which inculcate values in violation of re-
ligious beliefs).
150. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 702.




The Tenth Circuit declined to extend the concept of parental rights
so that parents of home schooled students could dictate all elements of
their child's education.52 Arguably, the court protected the states' "wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things af-
fecting the child's welfare" in the educational context."3 The rationale for
this arises from the state interest in securing a child's development into a
productive adult citizen of the state.' This, however, conflicts with the
views of proponents of parental rights who dislike the increased amount
of state intervention into the lives of families."" Critics of the parental
rights movement argue that proposed legislative reforms" "go too far
towards isolating parental authority from the oversight of the community,
to the detriment of children's interests and rights.""7 Regardless, the Su-
preme Court has yet to state that parents have a fundamental right to di-
rect the upbringing of their child in its totality, although choices about
family life rank as "of basic importance in our society.""
In the home school arena, without this fundamental parental right to
direct the totality of a child's education, states and public school districts
will continue to exercise a great deal of discretion in their designated role
as the trustees of public education. " ' Parents who wish to complement
their child's home education by enrolling their students part-time in pub-
lic schools likely must rely on the state legislatures and local policies, not
federal law to do so.
As a threshold matter, many states statutorily guarantee the right of
parents to educate their children at home."w Home schooling, however,
152. See id. at 699.
153. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
154. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168; see also David Fisher, Note, Parental Rights and the Right to
Intimate Association, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 407 (1997) (acknowledging that a state can "compel
school attendance, regulate child labor, and demand that children be vaccinated (whether or not this
violates parents' personal and religious view of medical treatment)").
155. See Fisher, supra note 154, at 399.
156. See, e.g., The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, S. 984, 104th Cong. §
2(b)(6) (reestablishing a four-part process for analyzing parental rights that are in conflict with a
government interest).
157. Fisher, supra note 154, at401. "This extended right of parental control results in a danger-
ous and unnecessary cession of state power that necessarily tramples on the fundamental rights of
children." Id.
158. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 564 (1996) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 376 (1971)). But see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983) (stating that the "relationship
of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protec-
tion").
159. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (noting that "while parents have a
constitutional right to send their children to private schools and a constitutional right to select private
schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children
with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation").
160. See Fuller, supra note 141, at 1612 & n.62 (listing state statutes guaranteeing the right to
home school).
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cannot usually provide activities such as band, chorus, certain classroom
activities, and many sports without some level of cooperation with an
established educational institution.'1 To ensure such cooperation, states
(or local agencies) should enact laws that allow some type of public
school access to students who are educated primarily at home. So far,
thirteen states have enacted such statutes.62
Illustratively, in the arena of high school sports, the courts have
determined that a student's participation in sports is a privilege and not a
right, and consequently does not receive due process protection. Gener-
ally, a student's right to participate in sports does not rise to the level of a
fundamental right as the latter rights "have their genesis in the ex-
press[ed] and implied protections of personal liberty recognized in fed-
eral and state constitutions.'"" The right to participate in extracurricular
activities is not analogous to the right to free speech in both state and
federal constitutions; government cannot accord fundamental status to
the right to participate in extracurricular activities.'" Rather, this right is
subject to the whims of local educational agency regulations.'" Such an
unprotected status can, depending on the jurisdiction, isolate home
schooled students from local educational agency benefits.'67
Finally, full-time attendance policies can unduly burden the home
schooled student as they allow exclusion of students from a benefit that
they (or their parents) support through taxes. Ironically, in Annie Swan-
son's case, the court implies that the determining factor in the disposition
was the parent's exercise of an educational choice that excluded Annie
from public education and not the school board's policy against part time
attendance. '"
161. See Betty Jo Simmons, Classroom at Home, AM. ScH. BOARDJ., Feb. 1994, at 47,47.
162. See Fuller, supra note 141, at 1615 & n.73.
163. See Derwin L. Webb, Home-Schools and Interscholastic Sports: Denying Participation
Violates United States Constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection Rights, 26 J.L. & EDUC.
123, 123 (1997) (inferring that participation in sports and other extracurricular activities in public
schools is usually a privilege not a right). But see Boyd v. Board of Dirs. of the McGehee Sch. Dist.
No. 17, 612 F. Supp. 86, 93 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (holding that a high school football player who had the
potential to obtain a college scholarship had a constitutionally protected property interest in partici-
pation in sports as participation was a "vital and indispensible" part of his attempt to win a scholar-
ship).
164. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex. 1985) (holding that students
do not have a constitutionally protected interest in participation in extracurricular activities); see also
Webb, supra note 163, at 127.
165. See Stamos, 695 S.W.2d at 560.
166. Cf Webb, supra note 163, at 125 (listing numerous criteria on which state boards or
athletic associations base their admissions regulations).
167. Cf.id.
168. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998)
(stating that there is no constitutional protection to pick and choose which classes or activities your




Other circuits have yet to address home schooling and its constitu-
tional implications. The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Swanson makes the
case somewhat of an anomaly in the federal system.
HI. CONCLUSION
Education of children fundamentally concerns parents and politi-
cians alike. While the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA were supposed to
clarify the appropriate level of funding allocated per student, the fact that
each state may now be required to determine what proportionate share of
federal funds each child receives may delay the actual disbursement of
funds. Clearly, a delay in providing educational services was not the pur-
pose of the Amendments, but such delay threatens to emerge as more
complicated calculations determine allocation of funds to disabled chil-
dren. The Amendments confer a great deal of authority upon local edu-
cational agencies to determine the best educational solutions for disabled
children and while parents involve themselves in the approval of these
decisions, the legal trend seems to be one of deference to schools'
choices and not parental demands.
Likely, the current debate on the appropriate level of state and pa-
rental involvement in the direction a child's education will continue,
barring a Supreme Court determination that directing a child's education
is a fundamental parental right. Home schooling remains a viable and
legal option for parents; however, without state support or legislative
action, parents will continue to struggle to enroll their children in public
school programs on a part-time basis. Local educational agencies legally
and effectively may ban home schooled children from participation in
publicly funded activities.
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